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ORAL EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS AND
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL: THE REAL
ESTATE BROKER AS VICTIM
Keely is a licensed real estate broker.1 The owner of a parcel
of land orally engaged Keely to sell his property for a commission.
Keely presented the property to an attorney, Price, who was acting on
behalf of a group of buyers. Price made an offer lower than the asking
price to which the owner agreed on condition that the buyers pay
Keely's commission and Keely release the owner from his obligation.
On behalf of the buyers, Price orally promised to pay Keely a commis-
sion in return for his services as a broker and also to reduce the contract
to writing. Keely contended that Price made these promises with no
intention of performance.' In reliance on these representations, Keely
performed services and incurred expenses while acting as a broker.
Price never reduced his promise to writing, and although the sale of
the property was consummated, Keely received no commussion.
The above account summarizes the facts as alleged by the plaintiff
in a recent California Court of Appeal case, Keely v. Price.3 The ac-
tions of Price clearly come within California's statutory definition of ac-
tual fraud:
Actual fraud, within the meaning of this Chapter, consists in any
of the following acts, committed by a party to the contract, or with
his conmvance, with intent to deceive another party thereto, or to
induce hin to enter into the contract:...
4. A promise made without any intention of performing it . . .4
Nevertheless when Keely, the broker, sued for his commission on the
oral contract, the trial court upheld a demurrer to the entire complaint
based on the statute of frauds.5 The court of appeal upheld the demur-
rer as to causes of action m breach of contract and in fraud, ruling that
equitable estoppel was unavailable to prevent the use of the statute of
frauds.6
1. See Keely v. Price, 27 Cal. App. 3d 209, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1972).
2. Actual fraud on the part of Price was never proven but was accepted as true
for the purpose of sustaining a demurrer.
3. 27 Cal. App. 3d 209, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1972).
4. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1572(4) (West 1954).
5. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 210-11, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
6. Id. at 214, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 535. The court allowed a third cause of action
based on tortious interference, which permitted the plaintiff to take discovery and pos-
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Similar cases of fraud are far from unusual in the California real
estate business. Thousands of dollars in earned commissions are lost
each year owing to the prevailing belief among attorneys and courts
that the statute of frauds is an absolute bar to recovery for a broker's
services on an oral contract to sell real estate. Such belief is encour-
aged by standard reference works on California real estate law.7
The courts have based the denial of equitable estoppel to real es-
tate brokers on two grounds. First, they explain, since real estate
transactions are particularly susceptible to fraudulent claims for serv-
ices, public policy requires that the statute of frauds be rigidly en-
forced.8 Second, they reason, a broker has no right to rely on an oral
contract of employment since he knows that such a contract must be
in writing.9 While this reasoning may still be somewhat persuasive,
its soundness should be reassessed, as the broker's position in relation to
the public has changed considerably since the enactment of the statute
of frauds provision concerning brokers' employment contracts. The
balance of the equities may have shifted since 1878 owing to greater
public control over the broker and a change in the practicalities of the
real estate business.10
The purpose of this note is twofold: first, to show that the court
in Keely misinterpreted the law in denying a defrauded broker the use
of the doctrine of equitable estoppel against a buyer's assertion of the
statute of frauds in a suit for breach of an oral employment contract;
second, to argue that allowing the broker a cause of action through the
use of estoppel would be fair. The discussion will commence with a
brief treatment of the historical development of the statute of frauds
and an explanation of the three types of fraud that may be perpetrated
against a broker. Next, the development of the California doctrine of
estoppel to assert the statute of frauds will be traced by reference to
California Supreme Court and legislative pronouncements as to its
proper use. Inquiry will then be directed toward supreme and appel-
late court decisions concerning the use of estoppel against the particular
subsection of the statute of frauds which requires that a contract for
services in selling or leasing real estate be in writing. The discussion
will conclude with an examination of the equities of the broker's case.
sibly to uncover some written memorandum of the contract sufficient to satisfy the stat-
ute of frauds. Id. at 216, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
7. See 1 H. MILLm & M. STARR, CuRENnr LAw OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE
220-21 (1965); STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SALES TRANSAC-
TIONS §§ 5.6-.9 (1967).
8. See cases cited note 128 infra.
9. See cases cited note 129 infra.
10. See text accompanying notes 128-42 infra.
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Estoppel To Assert the Statute of Frauds:
The Context
The Statute of Frauds
The first statute of frauds was enacted in 1676 to prevent "many
fraudulent practices, which are commonly endeavored to be upheld by
perjury and subornation of perjury."11  The statute required that cer-
tain contracts be in writing to be enforceable.
The California statute of frauds was first enacted in 1872.12 A
provision relating to real estate brokers was added in 1878.3 This
provision was amended in 196314 and 196715 to read as follows:
The following contracts are invalid, unless the same, or some note
or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party
to be charged or by his agent:
5. An agreement authorizing or employing an agent, broker,
or any other person to purchase or sell real estate, or to lease real
estate for a longer period than one year, or to procure, introduce,
or find a purchaser or seller of real estate or a lessee or lessor of
real estate where such lease is for a longer period than one year,
for compensation or a commission .... 16
For convenience, this provision will hereinafter be referred to as sub-
section 5.
Types of Fraud
To clarify discussion of the possible applications of equitable
estoppel, it is essential first to distinguish clearly among three types of
fraud: actual fraud, unjust enrichment, and unconscionable injury.
Actual fraud, sometimes called intentional, legal or promissory fraud,
occurs when one party enters into a contract without any intention of
performing it.17 In the context of real estate transactions, this type of
fraud would result if a broker's employer intended to cheat the broker
out of his commission. Such is the case when the owner of real estate
orally promises to pay a commission in order to induce a broker to ren-
der services but has no intention of honoring the promise. Keely v.
Price's8 is an example of actual fraud.
The other two types of fraud are resulting frauds. In the termi-
11. Act for Prevention of Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1676).
12. CAL. Crv. CoDE § 1624 (West 1973) (enacted 1872).
13. Acts Amendatory of the Civil Code, Cal. Stat. 1877-78, ch. 165, § 1, at 86.
14. Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 814, § 1, at 1843.
15. Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 52, § 1, at 953.
16. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(5) (West 1973).
17. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
18. 27 Cal. App. 3d 209, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1972).
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nology of Monarco v. Lo Greco,9 to be discussed shortly, ° such fraud
inheres in the result of the transaction. The first type, unjust enrich-
ment, results when one party to an oral contract receives benefits under
the contract but avoids his own performance by asserting the statute
of frauds. 1 For a finding of unjust enrichment, a transaction must be
analyzed from the employer's point of view. Unjust enrichment works
a fraud upon a broker if his employer is enriched owing to the uncom-
pensated services of the broker. Such fraud can occur when an oral
contract to sell real estate is consummated through the broker's efforts.
By asserting the statute of frauds, the owner may enjoy the fruits of
the broker's labor but pay nothing.
The other type of resulting fraud, unconscionable injury, is present
when one party to a contract has been induced by the other seriously
to change his position in reliance on the contract but through operation
of the statute of frauds22 does not receive the benefit of his bargain.
An inquiry concerning unconscionable injury focuses on the broker's
side of the transaction. A broker is unconscionably injured when he
has expended a great deal of effort in reliance upon an oral promise
of a commission but is never paid. The determinative factor here is
not the consummation of a sale, as in the case of unjust enrichment,
but the reasonable reliance of the broker in working to procure a ready,
willing and able buyer.
All three types of fraud will be discussed in detail,2 3 and the dis-
tinctions should be kept in mind. It should also be noted, however,
that all three types may be present in one transaction. Such is the case
in Keely v. Price. Not only did the owner commit actual fraud, but
he was unjustly enriched, as he enjoyed without cost the result of the
broker's efforts. The broker was also unconscionably injured, as he
performed his part of the oral bargain in reasonable reliance upon the
owner's promise of a commission but was never paid.
Early Development of Equitable Estoppel
Since the purpose of the statute of frauds is to prevent fraud,
courts soon recognized that equity should prevent the use of the statute
to perpetrate a fraud.2 4 The doctrine of equitable estoppel was applied
to prevent a defendant from asserting the statute as a defense to an
oral contract when to do so would work a fraud upon the plaintiff.
19. 35 Cal. 2d 621, 623, 220 P.2d 737, 739 (1950).
20. See text accompanying notes 31-37 infra.
21. 35 Cal. 2d at 623-24, 220 P.2d at 740.
22. Id. at 623, 220 P.2d at 739.
23. See text accompanying notes 26-36 infra.
24. See Comment, Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds in California, 55
CALIF. L. REV. 590, 595 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Equitable Estoppel].
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Actual fraud was the first type of fraud to be recognized as
a ground for estoppel.2 5 In a case in which a defendant intended to
deceive a plaintiff by inducing a one-sided performance of the bargain,
an equity court would enforce the oral contract despite the statute of
frauds.2 6 Whether or not such a practice is technically an equitable
estoppel is immaterial:
It cannot be questioned that legal fraud creates an estoppel against
the Statute of Frauds. On theory this would seem rather needless
as fraud in itself is a sufficient reply against the plea of the statute
without resort to estoppel, but practically it does no harm.
27
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is more useful, however, in
cases of resulting fraud. 28  The historical development of this principle
has been extensively treated elsewhere.2  For purposes of the present
discussion, examination of the current California doctrine is sufficient.
California Supreme Court
The modem version of the doctrine of equitable estoppel was an-
nounced and explained in a 1950 California Supreme Court case, Mon-
arco v. Lo Greco.30 In Monarco, Christie Castiglia was orally promised
by his mother and stepfather that if he stayed and worked on the family
farm, the parents would keep it in joint tenancy, and the survivor would
devise to him the bulk of the farm. In reliance an this oral promise,
Christie remained on the farm and worked diligently, giving up any op-
portunity to get an education or to accumulate his own property. He
received only room and board and spending money. When the step-
father died, he left all of his property to a grandson. Nevertheless, the
California Supreme Court enforced the oral contract between Christie
and his parents, holding the grandson estopped to assert the statute of
frauds.31
The importance of Monarco is to be found in the rules enunciated
for the use of equitable estoppel:
The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute of frauds has been
consistently applied by the courts of this state to prevent fraud that
would result from refusal to enforce oral contracts in certain circum-
stances. Such fraud may inhere in the unconscionable injury that
25. See Summers, The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 79
U. PA. L. REV. 440, 446 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Summers].
26. Id. at 444.
27. Id. at 452 (footnote omitted).
28. See id. at 446. See also Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737
(1950).
29. See generally Equitable Estoppel, supra note 24, at 590; Note, Part Per-
formance, Estoppel, and the California Statute of Frauds, 3 STANs. L. REv. 281 (1951).
30. 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950).
31. Id. at 627, 220 P.2d at 742.
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would result from denying enforcement of the contract after one
party has been induced by the other seriously to change his position
in reliance on the contract, or in the unjust enrichment that would
result if a party who has received the benefits of the other's perfor-
mance were allowed to rely upon the statute.
32
This language clearly states that an equitable estoppel may be justified
by the application of either of two tests. The first test looks to the plain-
tiff and finds estoppel appropriate if he has suffered an unconscionable
injury due to a serious change of position in reliance on the oral con-
tract; the second considers possible unjust enrichment of the defend-
ant. Subsequent cases have recognized that these two tests are sep-
arate.33
Although unjust enrichment and unconscionable injury are inde-
pendent grounds on which to base an equitable estoppel, the California
courts rarely find an estoppel based solely on unjust enrichment.
There are two reasons for this result. First, a single set of facts often
reveals both unjust enrichment and unconscionable injury. 34 If the de-
fendant is unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff, the plaintiff
will normally suffer unconscionable injury due to his expenditures of
time and money in reliance on the defendant's oral promise to pay a
commission. Second, a court will not allow an equitable estoppel based
on unjust enrichment if quantum meruit is an adequate remedy.3 5 The
theory of quantum meruit allows a plaintiff to recover the reasonable
value of services rendered where the contract under which he per-
formed is for some reason unenforceable. However, despite these two
reasons, there would seem to be no justification, given the proper facts,
for a court's refusal to find an equitable estoppel based on unjust en-
richment alone. This point will be explored later.3 6
Monarco also clarifies the use of the unconscionable injury test.
The opinion explains the type of oral promises or representations upon
32. Id. at 623-24, 220 P.2d at 739-40 (citations omitted).
33. See, e.g., Redke v. Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 490 P.2d 805, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293
(1971); Estate of Baglione, 65 Cal. 2d 192, 417 P.2d 683, 53 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1966);
Day v. Greene, 59 Cal. 2d 404, 380 P.2d 385, 29 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1963); see also Note,
Statute of Frauds-The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds, 66
MICH. L. REv. 170 (1967).
34. See, e.g., Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950); Notten
v. Mensing, 3 Cal. 2d 469, 45 P.2d 198 (1935); Ryan v. Welte, 87 Cal. App. 2d 897,
198 P.2d 357 (1948).
35. Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 625, 220 P.2d 737, 740 (1950).
"Those cases, however, that have refused to find an estoppel have been cases where the
court found either that no unconscionable injury would result from refusing to enforce
the oral contract or that the remedy of quantum meruit for services rendered was ade-
quate." Id. (citations omitted); see Ruinello v. Murray, 36 Cal. 2d 687, 227 P.2d 251
(1951); cf. Tompkins v. Hoge, 114 Cal. App. 2d 257, 250 P.2d 174 (1952).
36. See text accompanying notes 59-63, 93-97 infra.
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which a plaintiff has a right to rely in performing services. The case
lays to rest the belief that the estoppel can be based only on representa-
tions of the defendant concerning the application of the statute of
frauds itself. No such representations are in fact required:
In reality it is not the representation that the contract will be put
in writing or that the statute will not be invoked, but the promise
that the contract will be performed that a party relies upon when
he changes his position because of it. Moreover, a party who has
accepted the benefits of an oral contract will be unjustly enriched
if the contract is not enforced whether his representations related
to the requirements of the statute or were limited to affirmation
that the contract would be performed.
87
Legislative Intent
Though the Monarco reasoning is not limited to any particular
class of contracts governed by the statute of frauds, the California
courts have consistently denied the application of equitable estoppel to
subsection 5.38 This result can be neither explained by the language
of the statute nor justified by the early case law development of the
doctrine of equitable estoppel.
When the California Legislature enacted the first statute of
frauds in 1872, it also enacted Civil Code section 1623, which codified
the prevailing equitable rule limiting the use of the statute of frauds:
Where a contract, which is required by law to be in writing, is pre-
vented from being put into writing by the fraud of a party thereto,
any other party who is by such fraud led to believe that it is in
writing, and acts upon such belief to his prejudice, may enforce it
against the fraudulent party.
39
When the statute of frauds provision relating to contracts for services
in the sale of real estate was added in 1878, Civil Code section 1623
was still in effect, modifying the use of the entire statute of frauds.
Though the legislature seems to have codified the prevailing principle
of equitable estoppel in 1872,40 principles of equity did not remain
static. Subsequent cases extended the principle of equitable estoppel
from a situation in which the defrauded party was led to believe the
contract was in writing, to cases in which the representation was that
a writing would be executed in the future,4' that a writing would be
37. 35 Cal. 2d at 626, 220 P.2d at 741.
38. See cases cited notes 68, 77 infra. But see Le Blond v. Wolfe, 83 Cal. App.
2d 282, 188 P.2d 278 (1948).
39. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1623 (West 1973) (enacted 1872). This California statute
was based on and exactly duplicated the then existing New York law. See 2 J. STORY,
EQUrTy JURisPuRDENCE § 768, at 92-94 (6th ed. 1853).
40. See generally Summers, supra note 25, at 44349. Actual fraud has always
been a basis for equitable relief. Id. at 446.
41. Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909).
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legally unnecessary,12 or that the statute would not be relied upon as
a defense.4 3 In none of these cases did the court restrict the use of
estoppel to any particular subsection(s) of the statute of frauds. In
a landmark case applying equitable estoppel because of a representa-
tion that a contract would be reduced to writing in the future, the court
said:
We can see no good reason for limiting the operation of this equit-
able doctrine to any particular class of contracts included within
the statute of frauds, provided always the essential elements of an
estoppel are present. .... 44
In summary, then, it seems that at no time up to and including
the decision in Monarco did the California Legislature ever indicate an
intent to restrict the use of equitable estoppel to any class of contracts
within the statute of frauds. Nor have any supreme court decisions in-
terpreting and expanding the doctrine of equitable estoppel imposed
such a restriction. Nonetheless, only one California case has ever al-
lowed the application of that doctrine to subsection 5 .5 Why is there
such hostility to real estate brokers? Is there any equitable reason for
treating subsection 5 agreements differently from those covered by the
other nine subsections? The only way to answer these questions is to
examine California decisions in which a broker suing on an oral em-
ployment contract has pleaded equitable estoppel to assert subsection
5.
Estoppel To Assert Subsection Five
Supreme Court Decisions
The California Supreme Court has never categorically denied the
use of equitable estoppel to assert subsection 5. On the contrary, the
court in recent decisions has seemed to imply that, given the proper
facts, estoppel would be a proper remedy for a real estate broker.4 6
The court has mentioned the Monarco case twice in cases involving a
broker's suit for a commission earned on an oral contract of employ-
ment.17  These recent decisions may be most profitably examined fol-
42. Fleming v. Dolfin, 214 Cal. 269, 4 P.2d 776 (1931).
43. Vierra v. Pereira, 12 Cal. 2d 629, 86 P.2d 816 (1939). See generally Equita-
ble Estoppel, supra note 24, at 595.
44. Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 795, 106 P. 88, 94 (1909).
45. Le Blond v. Wolfe, 83 Cal. App. 2d 282, 188 P.2d 278 (1948). See text ac-
companying notes 71-72 infra.
46. See Beazell v. Schrader, 59 Cal. 2d 577, 381 P.2d 390, 30 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1963); Franklin v. Hansen, 59 Cal. 2d 570, 381 P.2d 386, 30 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1963);
Pacific S.W. Dev. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 47 Cal. 2d 62, 301 P.2d 825 (1956).
47. See Franklin v. Hansen, 59 Cal. 2d 570, 577, 381 P.2d 386, 390, 30 Cal. Rptr.
530, 534 (1963); Pacific S.W. Dev. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 47 Cal. 2d 62, 70, 301
P.2d 825, 830 (1956).
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lowing a brief overview of pre-Monarco decisions concerning the use
of subsection 5.
In cases arising before Seymour v. Oelrichs,4 8 a 1909 decision, the
supreme court applied subsection 5 strictly, giving little consideration
to the equities in each case. In every case in which a broker sued for
his commission on an oral employment contract, the court held that sub-
section 5 barred recovery whether in contract49 or in quantum meruit.50
In none of these cases did the court consider the application of an equit-
able estoppel.
Jamison v. Hyde5 is a good example of the harsh application of
this rule. The defendant, in his answer, admitted making an oral co-
tract but also pleaded the statute of frauds as a defense. The court
allowed the defendant to amend his pleadings to omit any admission
as to an oral contract. The plaintiff was denied relief both in contract
and in quantum meruit.
Seymour v. Oelrichs52 marks the beginning of a concern for the
equitable use of the statute of frauds. This decision contains an ex-
tensive discussion of equitable estoppel and concludes that it is not lim-
ited to any particular class of contracts within the statute. Five years
later, Smith v. Post5" held that since the written contract had expired,
the broker was barred by the statute of frauds from recovering a com-
mission, even though the subsequent sale approximated the terms of
the contract and the broker was instrumental in making the sale. Es-
toppel was not discussed. Nevertheless, the court took care in consid-
ering the equities of the case, holding that owing to special circum-
stances, the result was not inequitable. 54
In Smith v. Frans Nelson & Sons, Inc.,55 the court once again dem-
onstrated its concern with doing equity in a suit involving a broker's
48. 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909).
49. See Hicks v. Post, 154 Cal. 22, 96 P. 878 (1908); Jamison v. Hyde, 141 Cal.
109, 74 P. 695 (1903); Shanklin v. Hall, 100 Cal. 26, 34 P. 636 (1893); Zeimer v.
Antisell, 75 Cal. 509, 17 P. 642 (1888); McCarthy v. Loupe, 62 Cal. 299 (1882).
50. See Jamison v. Hyde, 141 Cal. 109, 74 P. 695 (1903); McGeary v. Satchwell,
129 Cal. 389, 62 P. 58 (1900); McPhail v. Buell, 87 Cal. 115, 25 P. 266 (1890); Myres
v. Surryhne, 67 Cal. 657, 8 P. 523 (1885); McCarthy v. Loupe, 62 Cal. 299 (1882).
These cases were based upon then subsection 6, which was renumbered subsection 5 in
1931.
51. 141 Cal. 109, 74 P. 695 (1903).
52. 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88 (1909). This case did not involve a broker's con-
tract but did involve an employment contract. The plaintiff was a captain of detectives
in the San Francisco Police Department. He left his secure job in reliance on an oral
contract of employment for ten years. He was also promised -that the contract would
be put in writing, but it was not.
53. 167 Cal. 69, 138 P. 705 (1914).
54. Id. at 77, 138 P. at 708.
55. 214 Cal. 295, 5 P.2d 427 (1931).
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commission earned on an oral contract. The statute of frauds was satis-
fied by the seller's statement in the escrow agreement that the broker
would be paid a specific amount on completion of the escrow transac-
tion. Escrow was never closed, but the broker alleged that his oral em-
ployment contract contained no such condition prerequisite to recovery.
The court ruled that the broker was limited to the conditions of employ-
ment specified in the escrow agreement, but suggested that such limita-
tions in an escrow agreement could be "[o]vercome by some direct
attack in equity .. .56
In 1950, the supreme court in Monarco indicated its still deepen-
ing concern over improper use of the statute of frauds by articulating
broad equitable rules for the application of estoppel.17 Since that deci-
sion, the court has had three occasions to consider a broker's suit to
recover a commission on an oral contract of employment. 8 None of
these cases found an estoppel. It seems, however, that this result is
not due to a rejection of equitable estoppel in a subsection 5 situation,
as none of the cases provided an adequate factual basis for the applica-
tion of estoppel.
Pacific Southwest Development Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad
Co.59 is often cited as requiring a strict application of subsection 5.60
Such a conclusion is not supported by the decision. The broker sued
for a 5 percent commission earned under an oral contract to procure
an option to purchase land. The equitable position of the broker was
weak, for his negotiations with the seller did not directly result in a
sale. Furthermore, even though the actual option to buy was negoti-
ated directly by the buyer, he still paid a 2/ percent broker's fee.
These facts did not support an estoppel:
The fact that plaintiff rendered services and conducted unsuccess-
ful negotiations with Lenfest [the seller] does not constitute a
change of position to plaintiff's detriment, nor does the fact that
defendant refused to pay plaintiff a real estate commission upon
an option which defendant later procured through direct negotia-
tions with Lenfest constitute an unjust enrichment within the mean-
ing of the estoppel doctrine. 61
The court was careful to add that no circumstances of actual fraud had
been shown.
Justice Carter, dissenting,62 would have allowed an estoppel based
56. Id.
57. See text accompanying notes 31-37 supra.
58. See cases cited note 46 supra.
59. 47 Cal. 2d 62, 301 P.2d 825 (1956).
60. E.g., Jaffe v. Albertson Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 592, 53 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1966);
King v. Tilden Park Estates, 156 Cal. App. 2d 824, 320 P.2d 109 (1958).
61. 47 Cal. 2d at 70, 301 P.2d at 830-31.
62. Id. at 73, 74-75, 301 P.2d at 833.
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on Monarco. His opinion was provoked by a disagreement not as to
the law but rather as to the amount of enrichment the defendant
received through the broker's efforts. Carter believed that the efforts
of the broker, while not involved in securing the final agreement of
sale, had so contributed to the negotiations as to make the option pur-
chase possible: "Defendant was unjustly enriched by the acceptance
of those services (he obtained the option) for which he refused to
pay."
0 3
Carter's reasoning as to the application of the unjust enrichment
test seems more persuasive than the majority argument since the trans-
action was completed with the help of the broker. Nevertheless, as
the equities in this case seem evenly balanced, the majority could un-
derstandably conclude that the broker's efforts had not been a material
benefit to the defendant.
The only cases since the 1956 decision in Pacific in which the
California Supreme Court has considered a broker's suit on an oral em-
ployment contract are Beazell v. Schrader" and Franklin v. Hansen,65
both decided on May 14, 1963. Beazell contains no reference to es-
toppel. The broker sued for a 5 percent commission on an oral con-
tract to sell an apartment building for $200,000. After due per-
formance by the broker, the seller signed an escrow instruction provid-
ing for a broker's commmission of only $2,500. The broker was lim-
ited to the amount in the escrow agreement through operation of the
statute of frauds. Nonetheless, the court explained: "The complaint
fails to charge defendant with any improprieties other than his failure
to perform the oral contract." 66 In other words, the broker did not
plead facts sufficient for equitable relief.
The plaintiff in Franklin also failed to allege fraud. The broker
sued for a commission of 5 percent on the sale of a house. The broker
procured a ready, willing and able buyer, but the seller backed out of
the agreement. The court found for the seller on the basis of the stat-
ute of frauds. Although these facts could not support an estoppel due
to unjust enrichment, as the sale was never consummated, they seem
to provide a classic example of a detrimental change in position due
to reliance on an oral contract. The broker, however, missed his
chance to argue estoppel: "Plaintiff herein has neither alleged nor
urged the application of an equitable estoppel . . . . 67 This state-
ment appears to wave a red flag inviting an argument of estoppel. The
63. Id. at 74, 301 P.2d at 833.
64. 59 Cal. 2d 577, 381 P.2d 390, 30 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1963).
65. 59 Cal. 2d 570, 381 P.2d 386, 30 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1963).
66. 59 Cal. 2d at 582, 381 P.2d at 393, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
67. 59 Cal. 2d at 576-77, 381 P.2d at 390, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 534, citing Mon-
arco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 (1950).
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supreme court seems only to be waiting for the right case and the
proper pleadings to invoke an estoppel to assert subsection 5.
Court of Appeal Decisions
Since common law principles of equity, California legislative his.
tory, and California Supreme Court decisions present no barriers to a
finding of estoppel to assert subsection 5, how did the court reach its
decision in Keely? The answer would seem to lie in an increasing in-
difference to equity and a pyramid of misinterpretation of law by the
California Courts of Appeal. This severe conclusion is supported by
a review of court of appeal cases applying subsection 5.
Prior to Monarco, the appellate courts had frequent opportunity
to consider brokers' suits on oral contracts of employment. With only
one exception, the courts denied any relief to the broker, whether in
contract, 68 in quantum meruit, 9 or in tort.70  The single case allowing
recovery was Le Blond v. Wolfe.71 In that case the broker released
the seller from a written promise to pay a commission in return for
an oral promise from the buyer to pay the commission. The buyer was
estopped to assert subsection 5 because of the broker's detrimental reli-
ance in releasing the written contract. 72  This case has never been ex-
tended beyond its facts.
73
A particularly good example of the harsh application of subsection
5 during this time is Colburn v. Sessin.'. Decided one year after Le
Blond, the court refused to find an estoppel. The broker was told by
the seller-defendant that he would be paid a 5 percent commission on
the sale of some real estate and that a written memorandum would be
executed. Relying on the seller's promise to pay, the broker found a
68. See Colburn v. Sessin, 94 Cal. App. 2d 4, 209 P.2d 989 (1949); Herzog v.
Blatt, 80 Cal. App. 2d 340, 180 P.2d 30 (1947); White v. Hirschman, 54 Cal. App.
2d 573, 129 P.2d 430 (1942); Sweeley v. Gordon, 47 Cal. App. 2d 381, 118 P.2d 14
(1941); Egan v. Pacific S.W. Trust & Say. Bank, 92 Cal. App. 1, 267 P. 719 (1928);
Kornman v. Nelson, 83 Cal. App. 616, 257 P. 150 (1927); Holland v. Flash, 20 Cal.
App. 686, 130 P. 32 (1912); Proulx v. Sacramento Valley Land Co., 19 Cal. App. 529,
126 P. 509 (1912).
69. See Ford v. Palisades Corp., 101 Cal. App. 2d 491, 225 P.2d 545 (1950);
Blanchard v. Huthsing, 97 Cal. App. 2d 234, 217 P.2d 476 (1950); White v. Hirschman,
54 Cal. App. 2d 573, 129 P.2d 430 (1942); Edgecomb v. Callahan, 132 Cal. App. 248,
22 P.2d 521 (1933); Gould v. Otto, 81 Cal. App. 409, 254 P. 272 (1927); Holland v.
Flash, 20 Cal. App. 686, 130 P. 32 (1912); Proulx v. Sacramento Valley Land Co., 19
Cal. App. 529, 126 P. 509 (1912).
70. See Kroger v. Baur, 46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 117 P.2d 50 (1941). See generally
Sanders, Book Review, 36 CALm. L. REV. 138 (1948).
71. 83 Cal. App. 2d 282, 188 P.2d 278 (1948).
72. Id. at 287, 188 P.2d at 281.
73. See, e.g., Keely v. Price, 27 Cal. App. 3d 209, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1972).
74. 94 Cal. App. 2d 4, 209 P.2d 989 (1949).
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buyer, who also orally promised that a commission would be paid.
Both requested an introduction pending the writing of the contract.
After the buyer and seller were introduced, they refused to pay the
broker, asserting subsection 5. The court distinguished Le Blond
since the broker in Colburn did not release a written contract and re-
fused to find an estoppoel. The most troublesome aspect of the case
is that the complaint contained an allegation, accepted as true on de-
murrer, that the promises were made with no intention of perform-
ance. 7" As stated previously, actual fraud, if proved, is clearly suffi-
cient for the granting of equitable relief .
76
Even after Monarco, the appellate courts continued to deny relief
to brokers, whether in contractW7 or in quantum meruit.7 8  Six of these
cases have considered the doctrine of estoppel as applied to subsection
5.79 One decision contains no reasoning as to the use of estoppel and
is not helpful.s0 The remaining cases provide extensive discusssion of
equitable estoppel and are generally relied upon as precluding the use
of the doctrine against subsection 5. s1 Each case merits scrutiny as to
the application of law and equity to the facts.
The cases of Augustine v. Trucco82 and King v. Tilden Park Es-
tatess3 can best be considered together, as they offer almost identical
75. Id. at 5, 209 P.2d at 990.
76. See Summers, supra note 25.
77. See Keely v. Price, 27 Cal. App. 3d 209, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1972); Osborne
v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 5 Cal. App. 3d 510, 85 Cal. Rptr. 793
(1970); Paulsen v. Leadbetter, 267 Cal. App. 2d 148, 72 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1968); Barce-
Ion v. Cortese, 263 Cal. App. 2d 517, 69 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1968); Rosenbaum v. Rosen-
baum, 257 Cal. App. 2d 193, 64 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1967); William E. Doud & Co. v.
Smith, 256 Cal. App. 2d 552, 64 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1967); Jaffe v. Albertson Co., 243
Cal. App. 2d 592, 53 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1966); Preston v. Carnation Co., 196 Cal. App.
2d 43, 16 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1961); King v. Tilden Park Estates, 156 Cal. App. 2d 824,
320 P.2d 109 (1958); Augustine v. Trucco, 124 Cal. App. 2d 229, 268 P.2d 780 (1954).
78. See William E. Doud & Co. v. Smith, 256 Cal. App. 2d 552, 64 Cal. Rptr.
222 (1967); Allen v. Powell, 248 Cal. App. 2d 502, 56 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1967); Preston
v. Carnation Co., 196 Cal. App. 2d 43, 16 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1961); King v. Tilden Park
Estates, 156 Cal. App. 2d 824, 320 P.2d 109 (1958); Augustine v. Trucco, 124 Cal. App.
2d 229, 268 P.2d 780 (1954).
79. See Keely v. Price, 27 Cal. App. 3d 209, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1972); Osborne
v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 5 Cal. App. 3d 510, 85 Cal. Rptr. 793
(1970); Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 257 Cal. App. 2d 193, 64 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1967);
Jaffe v. Albertson Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 592, 53 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1966); King v. Tilden
Park Estates, 156 Cal. App. 2d 824, 320 P.2d 109 (1958); Augustine v. Trucco, 124
Cal. App. 2d 229, 268 P.2d 780 (1954).
80. See Osborne v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist, 5 Cal. App. 3d
510, 85 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1970).
81. See note 7 & accompanying text infra.
82. 124 Cal. App. 2d 229, 268 P.2d 780 (1954).
83. 156 Cal. App. 2d 824, 320 P.2d 109 (1958).
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reasoning regarding the use of estoppel. Augustine involved an action
in four counts to recover a broker's commission: contract, tortious in-
terference, common count for labor and services, and common count
for money had and received. The court affirmed a judgment of dismis-
sal after sustaining the defendant's objection to the introduction of evi-
dence.
8 4
The defendant gave the broker an exclusive listing to sell land for
a 5 percent commission. After the expiration of the listing, the broker
got an oral extension along with an agreement to reduce the price.
He procured a ready, willing and able buyer, but the defendant post-
poned the sale. Eventually, he sold to the same buyer through a
broker who had been working for the plaintiff at the time of the origi-
nal listing.
85
King involved an action in three counts: contract, quantum meruit
and expenses incurred. A judgment of nonsuit was affirmed on ap-
peal.
86
The broker alleged an oral agreement with the head of a real es-
tate syndicate to find a buyer for a large tract of land in return for a
10 percent commission. The broker introduced the buyer and seller
and participated in extensive negotiations. The buyer orally agreed to
pay the broker, but the details of the compensation were never con-
cluded. After the sale was completed, both the seller and buyer de-
nied the existence of a contract with the broker and refused to pay
him.87
In both Augustine and King, the courts included extensive discus-
sions of estoppel to assert subsection 5. The reasoning in each case
was more or less the same. The Augustine court stated:
The fact that a broker, acting under an oral contract of employ-
ment, renders services to an owner in an effort to find a buyer fur-
nishes no basis for an estoppel of the owner to rely upon -the statute
of frauds.88
The King court emphasized:
It has long been held in this state that a real estate broker is pre-
sumed to know that contracts for real estate commissions are in-
valid and unenforceable unless put in writing8 9
Nevertheless, Augustine and King should not be relied upon as
authority for the notion that estoppel cannot be used against subsection
5. First, in neither case did the broker allege actual fraud. Both cases
84. 124 Cal. App. 2d at 234, 268 P.2d at 783.
85. Id. at 233-35, 268 P.2d at 783-84.
86. 156 Cal. App. 2d at 825-26, 320 P.2d at 110.
87. Id. at 826-28, 320 P.2d at 110-12.
88. 124 Cal. App. 2d at 242, 268 P.2d at 788.
89. 156 Cal. App. 2d at 830, 320 P.2d at 113.
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suggested a misunderstanding between broker, buyer and seller rather
than a promise made with no intention of performance. Therefore,
these cases say nothing about the use of equitable estoppel in cases of
actual fraud.
Furthermore, though Augustine was decided four years after
Monarco and King four years after Augustine, neither case mentions
Monarco. Indeed, both cases quote with approval the outdated state-
ment of the estoppel doctrine from the first edition of California Juris-
prudence:
Equity is bound by the statute of frauds, and, in general, will give
relief against it only in two classes of cases; first, where to allow
the statute to be set up would be to secure to the party relying upon
it the fruits of actual fraud; and second, where to allow the statute
to be set up would place the party resisting it in an inequitable posi-
tion, it appearing further that there is evidence just as good as a
writing of the agreement between the parties. To create an estop-
pel to assert the statute, the party relying on it must be able to
show clearly, not only the terms of the contract, but also such acts
and conduct of the opposite party as amount to a representation
that he will not avail himself of the statute to escape his agreement,
and, further, that the party asserting the estoppel has, in reliance
on such representation and in pursuance of the contract, so far al-
tered his position as to incur an unjust and unconscionable injury
and loss, if the statute be allowed to be set up. If no such loss
or injury is shown the reason for the estoppel fails. Changes in
the position of a party, not made as a necessary consequence of
an oral contract within -the statute, and not induced by or known
to the opposite party when the contract was made, do not estop
the latter from setting up -the statute.90
The result of ignoring the supreme court's pronouncement of
equitable estoppel in Monarco in favor of the California Jurisprudence
statement is twofold: first, the courts failed to recognize that the rep-
resentation of the defendant need not concern the application of the
statute itself; second, and more important, neither case considered the
possibility of estoppel based on the test of unjust enrichment.91 Al-
though it is arguable that the unconscionable injury test is precluded
by the broker's knowledge that an employment contract must be in
writing to be enforceable,92 it seems clear that the broker's knowledge
90. 12 CAL. JuR. Statute of Frauds § 103 (1923), quoted in 156 Cal. App. 2d at
831, 320 P.2d at 113-14, and 124 Cal. App. 2d at 241 n.2, 268 P.2d at 788 n.2.
91. Since Monarco precludes the unjust enrichment test for estoppel where quan-
tum reruit is an adequate remedy, estoppel is especially needed by real estate brokers.
The courts have consistently denied brokers relief in quantum meruit for services ren-
dered under an oral employment contract. See cases cited notes 50, 69, 78 supra. See
generally 12 AM. JuR. 2d Brokers § 53 (1964); Annot., 41 A.L.R.2d 905 (1955 & Supp.
1969).
92. See text accompanying notes 140-42 infra.
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of the statute of frauds is irrelevant to the unjust enrichment test. A
defendant may be unjustly enriched regardless of the reasonableness
of a broker's reliance on an oral promise to pay a commission.
The opinion in Jaffe v. Albertson Co.,9 3 while denying on the facts
the use of estoppel to assert subsection 5, at least recognizes the unjust
enrichment test stated in Monarco.94 The broker sued the seller of
a parcel of real estate for breach of an oral employment contract and
for conspiracy to interfere tortiously with his rights. A directed verdict
for the defendant was affirmed with respect to the contract cause of ac-
tion.95
The factual situation in Jaffe is complex. Briefly, the broker was
responsible for introducing a prospective buyer to the seller of a ranch,
priced around $30 million. The seller promised to pay a commission
for the broker's services. Extensive negotiations were conducted, but
a sale was never consummated. Eventually, the seller ended the nego-
tiations, claiming he had arranged to sell to another party. 6
Unlike Augustine and King, Jaffe gave careful consideration to
the Monarco case, discussing both tests for estoppel. Unjust enrich-
ment was determined not to be a ground for an equitable estoppel in
this case because the transaction was never consummated. Thus, the
seller was not enriched through the broker's efforts.97  This holding
suggests that if the sale had gone through to the party introduced by
the broker, then the seller would have been unjustly enriched, and an
estoppel would have been found.
The court also held that an estoppel could not be based on the
unconscionable injury test because the broker had no right to rely on
an oral contract of employment that he knew was unenforceable. In
other words, in accepting an oral contract, the broker assumed the risk
of not being paid."' This much of the decision is consistent with Au-
gustine and King. The equities of this long accepted rule will be ex-
amined shortly. 9
More troublesome than the decision in Jaffe is the opinion in Ro-
senbaum v. Rosenbaum.100 While the broker in Jaffe did not allege
actual fraud, the plaintiff in Rosenbaum did claim an oral promise to
pay a commission made with no intent to perform. The broker sued
on three theories: breach of contract, constructive trust and fraud. A
93. 243 Cal. App. 2d 592, 53 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1966).
94. Id. at 604, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
95. Id. at 598-600, 618, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31, 42.
96. Id. at 596-98, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 28-30.
97. Id. at 604, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
98. Id. at 604-05, 53 Cal. Rptr. at 33-34.
99. See text accompanying notes 128-42 infra.
100. 257 Cal. App. 2d 193, 64 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1967).
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judgment for the plaintiff was reversed by the court of appeal.'01
The plaintiff was the wife of the defendant at the time the oral
contract was made. On several occasions, she had been paid a broker's
commission by her husband on oral contracts for services in the sale
of real estate. The defendant was the director and president of Vis-
beek Industrial Park, Inc. and owned 30 percent of the stock. The
plaintiff was engaged to sell real estate on behalf of the corporation
for a 5 percent commission. She interested the local school board in
the property which was the subject of the disputed contract. After
negotiations, the school board filed a "friendly" complaint in con-
demnation to avoid certain taxes; that is, the board "condemned" the
property with the consent of the defendant. The broker was never
paid.1
02
The holding in this case seems muddled. While the court did not
expressly consider the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the opinion cites
several cases'03 concerned with estoppel to assert subsection 5.104 The
bulk of the opinion restates the rule, found in Augustine, King, and
Jaffe, that the plaintiff was a licensed real estate broker and had no
right to rely on an oral contract of employment.'0 5 Nevertheless, as
in Augustine and King, the court gave no consideration to the unjust
enrichment test.
The most disturbing aspect of this case is the court's consideration
of fraud. The trial court found that the defendant promised to pay
a broker's commission without any intent to perform, that this promise
was made to induce the plaintiff's reliance, and that she did rely on
the promise to her detriment. 06 Such a finding describes a clear case
of promissory fraud within the definition of Civil Code section 1572.117
Nonetheless, the only discussion by the court as to fraud is the follow-
ing:
Factually and regardless of the reason, the school district filed a
complaint in eminent domain against the Corporation property.
The school district had the authority to purchase property but did
101. Id. at 200, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
102. Id. at 195-97, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 634-35.
103. See, e.g., Pacific S.W. Dev. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 47 Cal. 2d 62, 301
P.2d 825 (1956); Jaffe v. Albertson Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 592, 53 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1966);
Augustine v. Trucco, 124 Cal. App. 2d 229, 268 P.2d 780 (1954); Kroger v. Baur, 46
Cal. App. 2d 801, 117 P.2d 50 (1941).
104. 257 Cal. App. 2d at 198-99, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
105. She also had no right to rely because she knew the defendant only owned 30%
of the corporation's shares and could not compel payment. Id. at 199, 64 Cal. Rptr.
at 636-37.
106. Id. at 197, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
107. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 1572(4) (West 1954). See text accompanying note 4
supra,
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not exercise the authority. The finding that the plaintiff procured
the purchaser is not founded upon the evidence.
Severing the concluded overtone that plaintiff's action is a sub-
terfuge to circumvent the statutory requirement that an employ-
ment contract of a real estate broker must be in writing to be en-
forceable from a cause of action in tort for fraud, plaintiff has
failed to sustain her burden of proof of fraud.'-0
The train of thought in this confusing statement is difficult to fol-
low. The opinion completely ignores the issue of actual fraud. The
court apparently reasons that since plaintiff did not procure a "pur-
chaser," the result of the condemnation did not work a fraud upon
her. 109 This conclusion rests on an application of the Monarco test for
resulting fraud to a tort action based on intentional fraud. Further-
more, the court ignores the possibility of an estoppel or other equitable
relief based on actual fraud. Thus, Rosenbaum illustrates the danger
of citing rules enunciated in older cases without a reasoned analysis as
to their general validity or particular applicability to the facts at bar.
The latest California case to consider the application of equitable
estoppel to assert subsection 5 is Keely v. Price."' This decision is
a clear example of the use of the statute of frauds as a sword rather
than a shield."' Through the plaintiff's efforts and expenditures in
reliance on an oral contract to sell a parcel of real estate, a sale was
consummated, but the broker was never paid." 2  Even though the
promise to pay a commission was made without any intention of per-
formance, the Keely court refused to find a cause of action in tort or
in contract through the use of estoppel to assert subsection 5. Not only
is the decision inequitable, but also it appears to be a prime example
of misinterpretation of the law as articulated by the California Supreme
Court.
The plaintiff alleged an estoppel to assert the statute of frauds and
relied on Monarco. The court held, however, that "the Monarco rul-
ing has not been generally applied to oral contracts to pay a real estate
broker's commission."" 3 In support of this statement, the court cites
seven cases, four of which were decided before Monarco,"4 two of
108. 257 Cal. App. 2d at 200, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 637 (citation omitted).
109. Does the court mean that even if the school board had a written contract with
the broker, it could avoid paying the commission by a "friendly" condemnation action?
110. 27 Cal. App. 3d 209, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1972). For a summary of the facts
of the case, see text accompanying notes 1-6 supra.
111. Colon v. Tosetti, 14 Cal. App. 693, 695, 113 P. 365 (1910). "The statute
of frauds is for the prevention, not in aid of the perpetration, of fraud. It is to be used
as a shield, not as a sword."
112. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 211, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
113. Id. at 212, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
114. See Hicks v. Post, 154 Cal. 22, 74 P. 695 (1908); Herzog v. Blatt, 80 Cal.
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which never considered the application of Monarco,115 and one of
which contained no circumstances of unjust enrichment or allegation
of promissory fraud.116 Moreover, the court seems to have misstated
the Monarco rule:
[A] defendant is precluded -from asserting the statute of frauds
where the plaintiff would be unconscionably injured or the defend-
ant unjustly enriched and the plaintiff, in reliance on the oral
promise, has changed his position.11
7
The court tries to connect the unjust enrichment test with the re-
quirement of a change in position by the plaintiff in reliance on an oral
contract. Actually, as stated previously, the change of position criter-
ion belongs exclusively to the unconsiconable injury test." 8  The un-
just enrichment test considers only the fraud that would result when
a defendant is unfairly benefited at a plaintiff's expense. Owing to a
confused understanding of Monarco, the Keely court never reached the
issue of unjust enrichment."19
The Keely court's discussion of estoppel' 20 is limited largely to dis-
tinguishing the instant case from Le Blond. 2' In Le Blond, the broker
released the seller from a written promise to pay a commission in re-
turn for an oral promise from the buyer to pay the same commission.
In Keely, the broker did not release an enforceable written contract
in reliance on an oral promise. Instead, he released another unenforce-
able oral contract. The cases are distinguishable only as to the degree
of the injury rather than as to the right of the broker to rely on a prom-
ise known to be unenforceable. 2 A broker should know that an oral
App. 2d 340, 180 P.2d 30 (1947); White v. Hirschman, 54 Cal. App. 2d 573, 129 P.2d
430 (1942); Sweeley v. Gordon, 47 Cal. App. 2d 381, 118 P.2d 14 (1941).
115. See King v. Tilden Park Estates, 156 Cal. App. 2d 824, 320 P.2d 109 (1958);
Augustine v. Trucco, 124 Cal. App. 2d 229, 268 P.2d 780 (1954).
116. See Pacific S.W. Dev. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 47 Cal. 2d 62, 301 P.2d
825 (1956).
117. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 212, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 533, citing Monarco v. Lo Greco,
35 Cal. 2d 62, 220 P.2d 737 (1950).
118. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
119. The court ignored Jaffe v. Albertson Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 592, 53 Cal. Rptr.
25 (1966).
120. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 212-14, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 533-35.
121. Le Blond v. Wolfe, 83 Cal. App. 2d 282, 188 P.2d 27'8 (1948). See text ac-
companying notes 71-72 supra.
122. Le Blond seems relevant only to the issue of how much detriment constitutes
an unconscionable injury. No case has considered this problem as to brokers, as the
courts have not gotten beyond the "reliance" barrier. Cf. Goldstein v. McNeil, 122 Cal.
App. 2d 608, 265 P.2d 113 (1954). In Goldstein the defendant was estopped to assert
the statute of frauds as a defense to a contract to purchase 14 used cars. Unconscion-
able injury was found due to a missed opportunity to sell the cars at a high market price
around the time of the contract instead of during the sharp slump which followed.
A real estate broker also misses opportunities when he expends timo in reliance on
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employment contract is unenforceable regardless of whether the con-
tract he releases in consideration thereof is written or oral. Moreover,
after attempting to distinguish Le Blond, the Keely court ignored other
relevant factors, such as unjust enrichment, expenditures of time and
money in reliance on the defendant's promise, and equitable principles
against actual fraud.
The court gave little independent thought to the allegation of
promissory fraud. The actual fraud in this case was pleaded as a cause
of action in tort. The only authority cited by the court in denying the
cause of action is one pre-Monarco case, Kroger v. Baur.' By a proc-
ess of bootstrapping, the court also uses Kroger as justification for de-
nying the use of equitable estoppel due to actual fraud.
Kroger held that the use of equitable estoppel against subsection
5 was barred by a lack of justifiable reliance on the part of the broker.
Therefore, the court reasoned, an action could not lie in tort for deceit,
for such an action would "nullify and destroy" the effect of the statute
of frauds. 124  Keely cites Kroger as precluding the use of intentional
fraud as a tort action in a case in which a broker relies on a fraudulant
oral promise to pay a commission for services in the sale of real estate.
Therefore, the Keely court reasoned, the statute of frauds cannot be
avoided by using actual fraud as a basis for equitable estoppel. This
circular reasoning reflects a pre-Monarco understanding of equitable
estoppel, since Kroger was decided nine years before Monarco estab-
lished unjust enrichment as an independent ground for an equitable es-
toppel. 2 ' Furthermore, both Kroger and Keely overlooked the an-
cient equitable principles against using the statute of frauds as a means
of perpetrating an actual fraud.
126
The only possible conclusion to this examination of recent Califor-
nia Court of Appeal decisions is that the courts are in a state of confu-
sion as to the use of equitable estoppel to avoid subsection 5.
Equitable Considerations
Even though a proper interpretation of California case law does
not preclude the use of equitable estoppel against subsection 5, brokers
face a further obstacle in the courts' traditional hostility to their
trade.127  Since estoppel is an equitable doctrine, the court must be
an oral contract of employment. See generally Equitable Estoppel, supra note 24, at
590.
123. 46 Cal. App. 2d 801, 117 P.2d 50 (1941).
124. Id. at 803, 117 P.2d at 52. This conclusion is erroneous, as the statute of
frauds was never meant to protect intentional fraud. See text accompanying notes 26-
27 supra.
125. 27 Cal. App. 3d 209, 215, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531, 535 (1972).
126. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 68-81 supra.
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convinced of the fairness of a broker's case before he will be granted
relief. A careful consideration of the modem real estate business
should leave the courts more sympathetic to the broker's position.
Two reasons have been advanced by the courts for denying real
estate brokers a cause of action through the use of estoppel. First, the
courts reason that public policy requires a strict application of the stat-
ute of frauds because real estate transactions are especially vulnerable
to fraudulent and multiple claims for services.128  Second, they assert
that since a broker knows that a contract for employment must be in
writing, he has no right to rely on an oral promise of a commission. 29
These arguments are not as strong as they may seem.
Public Policy
In the name of public policy, real estate brokers face double dis-
crimination. The legislature discriminates against them, for the real
estate business is the only occupation where contracts of employment
are specifically covered by the statute of frauds. 30 The courts further
discriminate against brokers, for subsection 5 is apparently the only
provision of the statute of frauds to which the doctrine of equitable es-
toppel is not applied. The only justification for this discrimination
seems to be the contention that the public needs special protection from
brokers because real estate transactions are particularly prone to fraud-
ulent and multiple claims for services.''
Is this discrimination against brokers really required by public pol-
icy? Surely, public policy is as much opposed to a fraud practiced on
a broker as to a fraud practiced by a broker. There seems little doubt
that actual, that is, intentional fraud on the part of the employer of a
broker should eliminate use of the statute of frauds as a refuge for with-
holding an earned commission. There is no public policy in encourag-
ing schemes to defraud brokers. As discussed previously, equity has
long enforced oral contracts despite the statute of frauds if the defend-
ant entered into the contract with no intention of keeping his part of
the bargain.'" 2 Why is this equitable rule denied to brokers?
128. See, e.g., Gorham v. Heiman, 90 Cal. 346, 27 P. 289 (1891); Brand v. Mantor
6 Cal. App. 2d 126, 44 P.2d 390 (1935); Cowing v. Wofford, 68 Cal. App. 538, 229
P. 883 (1924).
129. Pacific S.W. Dev. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 47 Cal. 2d 62, 301 P.2d 825
(1956); Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 257 Cal. App. 2d 193, 64 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1967);
William E. Doud & Co. v. Smith, 256 Cal. App. 2d 552, 559, 64 Cal. Rptr. 222, 227
(1967), quoting Kraemer v. Smith, 179 Cal. App. 2d 52, 55, 3 Cal. Rptr. 471, 473
(1960); see, e.g., Osborne v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist., 5 Cal. App.
3d 510, 85 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1970).
130. CAL. Cry. CoDE § 1624 (West 1973).
131. See cases cited note 128 supra.
139- See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
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Furthermore, public policy does not require a strict application of
subsection 5 in cases of resulting fraud, that is, unconscionable injury
or unjust enrichment. Other means are available to protect the public
adequately from unscrupulous brokers. In the first place, a broker en-
counters two formidable obstacles of proof in perpetrating a fraud by
means of a fabricated oral contract. Not only must he prove the ex-
istence of a contract without the benefit of a writing, but he must also
prove fraud in order to avoid subsection 5.133 An additional protec-
tion, interpleader, could insure against multiple liability in a situation
in which several brokers claim the same commission. 134  Furthermore,
moden licensing laws control the qualifications and activities of real es-
tate brokers and salesmen..'3  New York, in fact, has recognized that
licensing laws are sufficient public protection against fraudulent brokers'
claims; it has relieved licensed brokers from the coverage of its own
statute of frauds provision requiring contracts for services in sell-
ing real estate to be in writing.136  It would appear, then, that the
public is sufficiently protected against unscrupulous brokers to allow
brokers equitable protection against dishonest members of the public.
Reliance
If public policy does not dictate discrimination against brokers, the
courts are left with the argument that brokers have no right to rely on
an oral contract because they know it is unenforceable. 137  This argu-
ment, though persuasive on its face and sanctified by repetition, will
not withstand reflection concerning the realities of the real estate busi-
ness.
133. See text accompanying notes 24-36 supra.
134. See CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §§ 386-86.5 (West 1954); cf. Krassner v. Veneman,
206 Cal. App. 2d 299, 23 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1962).
135. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10150-65 (West 1964). California did not
begin to regulate real estate brokers and salesmen through licensing until 1917. Cal.
Stat. 1917, ch. 758, at 1579.
136. See N.Y. GEN. OB. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1964); N.Y. LAw REVISION
COMM., Report No. 65(G), at 615 (1949). But cf. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 217A, comment c, illus. 3 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973). This illustration
seems at first glance to be contrary to the use of equitable estoppel by real estate brok-
ers: "A orally promises to pay B a commission for services in negotiating the sale of
a business opportunity, and B finds a purchaser to whom A sells the business oppor-
tunity. A statute extends the Statute of Frauds to such promises, and is interpreted to
preclude recovery of the reasonable value of such services. The promise is not made
enforceable by B's reliance on it." Id. However, note that the illustration specifies a
seller of a business opportunity. In New York, brokers of business opportunities are
unlicensed and subject to the statute of frauds. Two cases are cited as authority for
illustration 3, both applying New York law. See Lee v. St. Joe Paper Co., 371 F.2d
797 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 821 (1967); Minichiello v. Royal Business Funds
Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 521, 223 N.E.2d 793, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820 (1966).
137. See cases cited note 129 supra.
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Before these realities are discussed, it must be re-emphasized that
the issue of the broker's right to rely is relevant only to the type of
fraud involving unconscionable injury. No expenditure of time and
money will amount to an unconscionable injury if the broker was un-
justified in relying on his employer's oral promise to pay a commission.
On the other hand, justification for reliance is immaterial where actual
fraud or unjust enrichment is concerned. Actual fraud will estop the
use of the statute of frauds because of the evil intent of the defend-
ant.138 Unjust enrichment will estop the defense of the statute because
the defendant voluntarily accepted benefits conferred under an oral
contract.'39  Thus, unjust enrichment will support an estoppel where
a transaction has been consummated through a broker's efforts under
an oral employment contract. Strictly speaking, the right to rely issue
is relevant only in cases where there is no actual fraud, the broker ex-
pends time and money fulfilling his part of an oral contract of em-
ployment, but the transaction is not consummated.
Can a broker suffer unconscionable injury in reliance upon an oral
employment contract which he knows is required to be in writing? The
courts have traditionally responded with an automatic "No." The
equities of the brokers' case are complex, however, and merit consid-
eration in light of the practicalities of the moden real estate business.
When subsection 5 was enacted in 1878, the typical seller of land
knew little about the real estate business. Such persons could prove
easy prey for dishonest brokers. Furthermore, legitimate contracts of
employment were normally simple enough to reduce conveniently to
writing. Recent brokers' suits on oral employment contracts have in-
volved not the small homeowner or businessman but instead complex
deals between corporations, government agencies or investment syndi-
cates.'40 Such parties are as knowledgeable about the statute of frauds
as the broker. Furthermore, they are often represented by attor-
neys.' 4 ' The seller, as well as the broker, knows the necessity of a
written contract.
Moreover, an independent broker is often at a disadvantage in
bargaining for a written contract. True, he may be in a position to
demand a writing from a homeowner. Nevertheless, his bargaining
power is slight compared with that of a corporation or investment syndi-
cate. If an independent broker demands that a contract of employ-
138. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
139. See text accompanying notes 33-36, 59-63, 93-97 supra.
140. See, e.g., Keely v. Price, 27 Cal. App. 3d 209, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1972);
Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 257 Cal. App. 2d 193, 64 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1967); Jaffe v.
Albertson Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 592, 53 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1966); King v. Tilden Park
Estates, 156 Cal. App. 2d 824, 320 P.2d 109 (1958).
141. See, e.g., Keely v. Price, 27 Cal. App. 3d 209, 103 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1972).
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ment be reduced to writing, but the employer procrastinates, the broker
can either trust the employer or abandon the chance to earn his living.
Thus, because of a disparity in bargaining power, the broker may be
a victim rather than a perpetrator of overreaching.
Finally, in large real estate transactions, it is often not feasible for
a broker and his employer to reduce a contract to writing. Complex
sales are subject to lengthy and detailed bargaining. Often, the parties
to a transaction do not know exactly what property will be involved or
the terms of the sale until they are well into negotiations.'42 Such prac-
ticalities often prevent a broker from demanding a contract of employ-
ment that would cover every contingency. Thus, after expending great
effort in the negotiation of a complex transaction, the broker may be
left with no assurance of receiving his promised commission.
These problems of bargaining power and business usage are not
an exhaustive account of the broker's position in equity. To a large
degree, the right to rely depends on the facts of each case. These is-
sues are raised merely to direct the courts to a new line of thought with
regard to reliance on an oral employment contract. The courts must
substitute judgment for the rote application of a threadbare rule.
Conclusion
Neither the California Legislature nor the California Supreme
Court has categorically denied the use of equitable estoppel to assert
subsection 5. Nevertheless, California Court of Appeal cases, such as
Keely, have consistently denied the use of equitable estoppel to real
estate brokers even in the most blatant situations of actual or resulting
fraud. Such decisions ignore the ancient equitable principle against ac-
tual fraud and miscontrue the Monarco doctrine which established un-
conscionable injury and unjust enrichment as two distinct grounds for
granting relief based on resulting fraud. Though the courts have justi-
fied discrimination against the broker for reasons of public policy, the
public has other adequate safeguards against unscrupulous brokers.
Furthermore, disparity of bargaining power and the practicalities of the
modem real estate business often preclude the broker from demanding
that every contract for his services be in writing. The courts must real-
ize that allowing a real estate broker to use the doctrine of equitable
estoppel to avoid the statute of frauds is not barred by precedent and
is mandated by fairness. The defrauded broker is entitled to a cause
of action.
Brian M. Englund*
142. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Albertson Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 592, 53 Cal. Rptr. 25
(1966).
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